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Limits of Scientific Learning: A Mathematical Theory of the Unlearnable in Hypothesis Testing

Statistical learning theory assumed that accumulating infinite data guarantees convergence to underlying empirical truths; this mathematical proof reveals rigorous topological boundaries where specific hypotheses remain fundamentally unlearnable.

Author
Hanti Lin
Published
2026
Journal
arXiv (Cornell University)
Last updated
September 2026
Limits of Scientific Learning: A Mathematical Theory of the Unlearnable in Hypothesis Testing

For a century, empirical science has operated under the philosophical and mathematical assumption that collecting sufficiently large datasets will eventually allow statistical algorithms to distinguish truth from falsehood.

In complex, high-dimensional hypothesis testing, certain structural relationships exhibit mathematical pathologies where classical statistical power collapses, creating a hidden domain of epistemic blindness.

This foundational mathematical paper establishes the 'Theory of Meager Success' using Baire category theory and algorithmic learning theory, proving that there exist broad classes of well-defined statistical hypotheses where no computable estimator can achieve better than meager learning success.

Mapping the exact mathematical boundaries of the unlearnable establishes profound limits on automated scientific discovery, warning data scientists against claiming definitive algorithmic truth on non-learnable hypothesis spaces.

Reference

Lin, H. (2026). Meager Success: A Theory of the Unlearnable for Hypothesis Testing (Version 2). arXiv.

Title

Meager Success: A Theory of the Unlearnable for Hypothesis Testing

Abstract

When the standard of pointwise consistency for statistical inference -- convergence to the truth in every possible state of the world -- is provably unachievable, the usual responses are to change the inferential target or to strengthen background assumptions. This paper pursues a third: hold the inference problem fixed and identify the highest standard that remains achievable. I define a hierarchy of standards weaker than pointwise consistency, cast in topological terms, requiring convergence to the truth not everywhere but on a ``large'' set of probability measures. The main result is an impossibility theorem: for finite-precision tests, converging to the truth densely within each hypothesis already forces inconsistency on a comeager -- ``topologically almost all'' -- set of measures, whenever the two hypotheses are dense in their union. Distribution-free testing of conditional independence is one such case. Two further theorems characterize, in purely topological terms, exactly when each weaker standard is achievable, complementing Boeken et al.'s (2026) analysis of pointwise consistency.

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