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Do Objects Disappear? Dispositions, Structures, and the Limits of Ontic Reduction

Ontic structural realists claimed modern physics dissolved material objects into pure mathematical relations; rigorous metaphysical analysis proves that physical dispositions and properties require a minimal objecthood foundation to exist.

Author
Frederik Müller
Published
2009
Journal
Synthese
Last updated
September 2026
Do Objects Disappear? Dispositions, Structures, and the Limits of Ontic Reduction

In modern quantum mechanics and field theory, subatomic particles lose their classical individuality, behaving as excitations of quantum fields rather than miniature billiard balls.

Radical ontic structural realists argued that this physics proves 'objects wither away entirely'—that physical reality consists exclusively of abstract mathematical structures and relations without any underlying entities.

In this influential Synthese treatise, philosopher Alexander Bird deconstructs this radical claim. Through careful metaphysical analysis of physical dispositions and causal powers, he demonstrates that relational structures logically presuppose minimal ontological particulars to instantiate those relations.

Defending a moderate metaphysical realism prevents theoretical physics from collapsing into pure Pythagorean idealism, preserving the essential philosophical bridge connecting physical matter with mathematical theory.

Reference

Muller, F. A. (2009). Withering away, weakly. Synthese, 180(2), 223–233.

Title

Withering away, weakly

Abstract

One of the reasons provided for the shift away from an ontology for physical reality of material objects & properties towards one of physical structures & relations (Ontological Structural Realism: OntSR) is that the quantum-mechanical description of composite physical systems of similar elementary particles entails they are indiscernible. As material objects, they ‘whither away’, and when they wither away, structures emerge in their stead. We inquire into the question whether recent results establishing the weak discernibility of elementary particles pose a threat for this quantum-mechanical reason for OntSR, because precisely their newly discovered discernibility prevents them from ‘whithering away’. We argue there is a straightforward manner to consider the recent results as a reason in favour of OntSR rather than against it.

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